Abstract-Road congestion induces significant costs across the world, and road network disturbances, such as traffic accidents, can cause highly congested traffic patterns. If a planner had control over the routing of all vehicles in the network, they could easily reverse this effect. In a more realistic scenario, we consider a planner that controls autonomous cars, which are a fraction of all present cars. We study a dynamic routing game, in which the route choices of autonomous cars can be controlled and the human drivers react selfishly and dynamically to autonomous cars' actions. As the problem is prohibitively large, we use deep reinforcement learning to learn a policy for controlling the autonomous vehicles. This policy influences human drivers to route themselves in such a way that minimizes congestion on the network. To gauge the effectiveness of our learned policies, we establish theoretical results characterizing equilibria on a network of parallel roads and empirically compare the learned policy results with best possible equilibria. Moreover, we show that in the absence of these policies, high demands and network perturbations would result in large congestion, whereas using the policy greatly decreases the travel times by minimizing the congestion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that employs deep reinforcement learning to reduce congestion by influencing humans' routing decisions in mixed-autonomy traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONGESTION can result in substantial economic and social costs [1] which have only been growing in recent years, especially with the advent of ride-hailing services [2] . Congestion is formed by a number of mechanisms, such as when many vehicles try to enter a road at the same time. A higher-level cause is from how people choose their routes -when people selfishly choose the quickest routes available to them, this often results in greater congestion and longer travel time than if people had their routes chosen for them optimally in terms of the overall experienced delay [3] . There are some existing methods for fighting congestion, such as congestion pricing [4] , variable speed limits [5] and highway ramp metering [6] . However, they can be difficult to administer, and can require significant changes to infrastructure.
The introduction of autonomous vehicles to public roads provides an opportunity for better congestion management. Our key idea is that by controlling the routing of autonomous vehicles, we can change the delay associated with traversing each road, thereby indirectly influencing peoples' routing choices. By influencing people to use more "socially advantageous" routes, we can eliminate long queues and significantly reduce traffic jams on roads.
The model for mixed-autonomy traffic, meaning traffic with both human-driven and autonomous vehicles, is complex, involving very large and continuous state space and continuous action space. Having human drivers dynamically respond to the choices of the autonomous vehicles further complicates the matter, making a dynamic programming-based approach and other classical methods infeasible. Because of this, we use deep reinforcement learning (RL) to learn a policy. Specifically, we show it is possible to learn a policy via proximal policy optimization (PPO) [7] that mitigates traffic congestion by managing routing of autonomous cars given the network state.
To understand the performance of the learned policy, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of the network. Previous works [8] , [9] have shown that there is a wide spectrum of equilibria in traffic networks, meaning situations in which everyone is taking the quickest route immediately available to them, and these equilibria can have greatly varying average user delay. We establish efficient ways to compute equilibria in the network and compare the best equilibrium (in terms of latency) with the RL policy, which works regardless of whether equilibrium conditions hold or not. We show that the learned policy reaches the 'desirable' equilibria that have low travel times when starting with varying traffic patterns, and can recover network functionality after a disturbance such as a traffic accident.
Our contributions are as follows: • Vehicle flow and choice modeling: We formalize a traffic model that extends the classic Cell Transmission Model (CTM) [10] to characterize vehicle flow on parallel shared roads. We adopt log-linear learning to model how people update their routing choices as traffic states change.
• Finding a control policy via deep RL: We employ deep RL methods to learn a routing policy for autonomous cars that effectively saves the traffic network from unboundedly large delays.
• Theoretical analysis: We characterize equilibria in the network and derive a polynomial-time computation for finding optimal equilibria. We show that the RL control policy is able to bring our network state to the best possible equilibrium when starting from a congested equilibrium or after a network disturbance. We visualize our framework as a schematic diagram in Fig. 1 and preview our results in Fig. 2 , showing that the RL policy successfully stabilizes queues in the traffic which would otherwise be congested.
Literature review. Many works seek to understand how much traffic network latency could be improved if vehicle routing was controlled by a central planner, including works on congestion games [3] , [11] - [14] . Some study how indirectly influencing peoples' routing choices by providing them network 
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Human-driven cars Autonomous cars Accidents Autonomous cars Accidents state information affects network performance [15] , [16] . Stackelberg Routing, in which only some of the vehicles are controlled, is another way to influence routing [17] , [18] ; some works incorporate the dynamics of human routing choices [19] . While providing useful techniques for analysis, the congestion game framework does not reflect a fundamental empirical understanding about vehicle flow on roads, namely that roads with low vehicle density have a roughly constant latency, and roads with high density see latency increase as flow decreases.
Works on CTM [10] , [20] capture this phenomenon, including works that characterize equilibria on roads described with CTM [6] . Notably, some consider equilibria, but not dynamics, of parallel-road Stackelberg Games, including with mixed autonomy [8] , [9] .
Some works look at the low-level control of autonomous vehicles, specifically how to control their acceleration to smooth traffic flow and ease congestion at bottlenecks [ 
II. VEHICLE FLOW DYNAMICS: MODELING ROADS
In this section we describe dynamics governing how vehicle flow travels on a road. We extend the CTM, a widely used model that discretizes roads into cells, each with uniform density [10] , [20] , for mixed-autonomy traffic. In CTM, each road segment has a maximum flow that can traverse it. The key idea of our extension is that since autonomous vehicles can keep a shorter headway (distance to the car in front of it), the greater the fraction of autonomous vehicles on a road, the greater the maximum flow that the road can serve [9] . Accordingly, our extension of CTM lies in the dependence of cell parameters on the autonomy level, or the fraction of autonomous vehicles, in each cell.
Consider a road, or path, p, composed of I p cells. Each cell i has the following parameters: free-flow velocityv p,i , headway for human driven cars (resp. autonomous cars) traveling at the free-flow velocity h Each cell also has a vehicle density, or number of vehicles on it, n p,i = n In the CTM, there are two regimes for vehicle flow: freeflow, in which the cell density is less than some critical density, and the congested regime, in which the cell density is greater than the critical density but less than the jam density. The jam density is the density at which traffic completely stops, denoted then p,i . As in [9] , [14] , [25] , [26] and represented in Fig. 3 (a) , we model 1 the critical density asñ p,i (α p,i ) :
There are three factors that can limit the flow from one cell to another. One is the capacity, or maximum flow out of a cell, which is the flow of vehicles that traverse the cell at the critical density:
The flow out of a cell is also limited by the demand in the cell, v p,i n p,i . The flow entering a cell is limited by that cell's supply,
Combining these, we denote the flow from cell i−1 to cell i on path p as f p,i−1 . As shown in Fig. 3 (b) , The flow from one cell to another is a function of the density n and autonomy level α in each cell. In both figures, we suppress the notation for path p.
We consider no capacity limit for vehicles entering a road and no supply limit for vehicles exiting a road. We use f p,0 to denote the flow entering path p and require that f p,0 ≤ (n p,1 − n p,1 )w p,1 (α p,1 ). Similarly, the flow exiting a road is
Putting this together, we describe the dynamical system (transition model of density of each cell on each path) as follows, where k denotes the time index.
Accidents. In order to evaluate the performance of the developed RL policy in reacting to disturbances, we consider stochastic accidents occuring in the network. We model traffic accidents as stochastic events, each of which causes one lane to be closed. We let accidents occur in any cell at any time with equal probability. Each accident is cleared out after some number of time steps, which is drawn from a Poisson distribution. Ifb p,i lanes of cell i of path p are closed due to accidents, then the jam density and the critical density for the cell reduce to (b p,i −b p,i )/b p,i of their original values. Hence, accidents introduce time-dependency to critical density and jam density variables.
III. NETWORK DYNAMICS: ROUTING FOR HUMANS AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
We consider a network of P parallel paths and use [P ] to denote the set of paths. We use λ h and λ a to denote the human-driven and autonomous vehicle demands, respectively. As the number of vehicles entering a road is limited by the supply of the first cells, we model cars desiring to enter the network as forming a queue q that consists of packets each holding q j cars. We provide a mathematical description of how this queue disburses cars into the network in the Appendix (Section VII-B).
A. Human choice dynamics
In general, people wish to minimize the amount of time spent traveling. However, people don't change routing choices instantaneously in response to new information; rather they have some inertia and only change strategies sporadically. Moreover, we assume people only account for current conditions and do not strategize based on predictions of the future [28] . Accordingly, we use an evolutionary dynamic to describe how a population of users choose their routes. Specifically, we model the human driver population as following Hedge Dynamics, also called Log-linear
Let µ h ∈ R P ≥0 be the routing vector for the human-driven flow, where µ h p represents the fraction of human-driven vehicles that choose to travel on path p; accordingly,
Let p (k) denote how long it would take to traverse path p if a user starts at time k; our model assumes that users have an accurate assessment of this delay, which is plausible given the widespread use of navigation services such as Google Maps or Waze. The routing vector is updated as follows.
. (4) The ratio of the volume of vehicles using a road at successive time steps is inversely proportional to the exponential of the delay experienced by users of that road. The learning rate η h (k) may be decreasing or constant. Krichene et al. introduce this model in the context of humans' routing choices and simulate a congestion game with Amazon Mechanical Turk users to show the model accurately predicts human behavior [32] .
B. Autonomous vehicle control policy
We assume that we have control over the routing of autonomous vehicles. We justify this by assuming that a city can coordinate with the owner of an autonomous fleet to decrease congestion in the city. Moreover, unlike traditional tolling, coordination between autonomous vehicles and city infrastructure makes it possible to have fast-changing and geographically finely quantized tolls, allowing routing control to be achieved through incentives [33] . The routing of autonomous vehicles is then our control parameter by which we influence the state of traffic on the network. We denote the autonomous routing vector µ a ∈ R P ≥0 , where p∈[P ] µ a p = 1. We assume the existence of a central controller, or social planner, which dictates µ a by processing the state of the network. At each time step, we let the controller observe:
• the number of human-driven and autonomous vehicles in each cell,
• the total number of human-driven and autonomous vehicles waiting in the queue, and • binary states for each lane that indicates whether the lane is closed due to an accident or not. We use deep RL to arrive at a policy for the social planner to control the autonomous vehicle routing, µ a . Since the state space is very large and both state and action spaces are continuous, a dynamic programming-based approach is infeasible. For instance, even if we discretized the spaces, say with 10 quantization levels, and did not have accidents, we would have 10 82 possible states, and 10 actions for a moderatesize network with 40 cells in total.
We wish to minimize the total latency experienced by users, which is equal to summing over time the number of users in the system at each time step. Accordingly, we consider the following stage cost:
Due to their high performance in continuous control tasks [7] , [34], we employ policy gradient methods to come up with a policy that produces µ a given the observations. Specifically, we use state-of-the-art PPO with an objective function augmented by adding an entropy bonus for sufficient exploration [7] , [35] . We build a deep neural network, and train it using Adam optimizer [36] . The set of parameters we use is in the Appendix (Section VII-E). We set each episode to have a fixed number of time steps.
In order to evaluate the performance of our control policy, we use three criteria. The first is the throughput of the network -we wish to have a policy that can serve any feasible demand, thereby stabilizing the queue. The second is the average delay experienced by users of the network, which we measure by counting the number of vehicles in the system. The third is the convergence to some steady state; we wish to avoid wild oscillations in congestion. To contextualize the performance of our control policy in this framework, we first establish the performance of equilibria of the network.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we examine the possible equilibria of our dynamical system, which characterize the possible steady state behaviors of the system. A network with a given demand can have a variety of equilibria with varying average user delay. If our control achieves overall delay equal to that of the best possible equilibrium, it is a successful policy. Section V shows that our learned policy can achieve the best equilibrium in a variety of settings.
We are interested in network equilibria, which require both equilibrium on each path as well as equilibrium with respect to the human choice dynamics. Equilibria are parameterized by vehicle flow demand. Hence, we assume for theoretical analysis that the flow demands are constant and there are no accidents. In this section we provide sketches of proofs for the theoretical results and defer the full proofs, including proofs of the lemmas, to the appendix. We first analyze path equilibria.
A. Path equilibrium
To ease our analysis, we begin by restricting the considered class of roads to those with a single bottleneck, meaning one point on the road at which cell capacity drops. Formally, we consider each path p to have m 
Proof. The proof is composed of three lemmas. We first establish a property of road equilibria that allows us to treat the vehicle flow as if it were composed of a single car type. With this, we use the CTM model to characterize possible equilibria on a road. We then derive the delay associated with each congested cell. Combining the latter two lemmas yields the theorem. We begin with a lemma based on the definition of equilibrium, in which there is constant incoming flow of each car type. Lemma 1. A path in equilibrium with nonzero incoming flow has the same autonomy level in all cells of the road, which is equal to the autonomy level of the vehicle flow onto the road. Formally, a path p with demand (λ
With this result, our analysis of road equilibria simplifies to that of single-typed traffic, with the autonomy level treated as a parameter. The next lemma, similarly to Theorem 4.1 of [6] , completely characterize the congestion patterns that can occur in road equilibria.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, if the demand on a road is less than the minimum capacity of its cells, they will be uncongested at equilibrium. Otherwise, a road with demand equal to the minimum cell capacity will have m n p equilibria. The set of equilibria has the following congested cells:
We use these properties to find a closed-form expression for the latency incurred by traveling through a bottleneck cell, which when combined with Lemma 2, completes the proof.
The two terms above are the free-flow delay and the percell latency due to congestion, respective. Theorem 1 allows us to calculate the possible latencies of a road as a function of its autonomy level α p . Since in a network equilibrium all used roads have the same latency, we can calculate network equilibria more efficiently than comprehensively searching over all possible routings. However, the discretization of roads into cell poses a problem -if cells are too big a network equilibrium may not even exist! To avoid this artifact from modeling with CTM, when analyzing network equilibria we consider the cells to be small enough that we can consider the continuous variable
B. Network equilibrium
We define the best equilibrium to be the equilibrium that serves a given flow demand with minimum latency. We are now ready to establish properties of network equilibria, as well as how to compute the best equilibria. We use the following two assumptions in our analysis of network equilibrium. We use the convention of ordering the roads in the order of increasing free-flow latency.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a routing that minimizes total latency when all users (both human drivers and autonomous users) are selfish can be computed in O(P 3 log P ) time. A routing that minimizes total latency when human drivers are selfish and autonomous users are controlled can also be computed in O(P 3 log P ) time.
Proof. We first establish properties of network equilibria.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, if some users are selfish and some users are not selfish, then the best equilibrium will have the following properties: 1) the road with largest free-flow latency used by selfish users will be in free-flow, 2) all roads with lower free-flow latency will be congested, 3) roads with greater free-flow latency may have nonselfish users, and 4) roads used with larger free-flow latency that have nonselfish users on them will be at capacity, except perhaps the road with largest free-flow latency that is used by nonselfish users.
Using these theoretical results, optimal equilibria can be calculated efficiently using the linear programs described in the Appendix.
Using these properties to compute optimal equilibria as in the Appendix (Section VII-D), we establish a framework for understanding the performance of our learned control policy. If the policy can reach the best equilibrium latency starting from arbitrary road conditions we view the policy as successful. We use this baseline to evaluate our experimental results in the following section.
A question then arises: if we have computed the best possible equilibria, why don't we directly implement that control? This approach is not fruitful, since the network can start in any state, including worse equilibria, from which good equilibria won't emerge when autonomous vehicles unilaterally use their routing in the best equilibrium. A dynamic policy which depends on the current traffic state is therefore needed to guide the network to the best equilibrium. As shown in the following, the learned policy reaches the best equilibrium in a variety of settings.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In all of the experiments 2 , we adopt the following parameters. All vehicles are 4 meters long. Human drivers keep a 2 second headway distance, whereas autonomous cars can keep 1 second. Each time step corresponds to 1 minute of real-life simulation. Each episode during deep RL training covers 5 hours of real-life simulation (300 time steps). In test time, we simulate 6 hours of real-life (360 time steps). We divide roads into the cells such that it takes 1 time step to traverse each cell in free-flow.
Our overall control scheme can be seen in Fig. 1(a) . As the learning model, we build a two-hidden-layer neural network, with each layer having 256 nodes. We train an RL agent for each configuration that we will describe later on. All trainings simulate 40 million time steps 3 . We compare our method with a baseline where all cars are selfish and use the human choice dynamics presented in Sec. III-A. In all experiments, we set η h (k) (and η a (k) for the baseline) to be 0.5 ∀k.
We consider a network from downtown Los Angeles to the San Fernando Valley with 3 roads. The highway numbers and the approximated parameter tuples (length, number of lanes, speed limit) are We perform three sets of experiments. In the first two, we disable accidents and set demand variance 0, i.e. λ a =λ a , λ h =λ h to have no perturbations after initialization. Varying number of roads. In the first set, we vary the number of routes P ∈ {2, 3, 4} by duplicating, or removing, the third route. We set the autonomy level of the demand α = 0.6, andλ h +λ a to be 95% of the maximum capacity under this autonomy level. We plot learning curves in Fig. 4 (a) . It can be seen that even with P = 4 when observation space is 144-dimensional (as the accidents were disabled), the agent successfully learns routing within 40 million time steps. With randomized initial states, the agents learn routing policies that achieve nearly as good as optimal equilibrium when P ∈ {2, 3}. While the agent for P = 4 also decreases the average cost, it requires either a little more training, or better hyperparameter tuning. In Fig. 4 (b) , we plot the number of cars (mean ± standard error over 100 simulations) in the system as a function of time steps. While selfish routing causes congestion by creating linearly growing queues when P > 2, RL policies successfully stabilize queues and even reach car numbers of optimal equilibria when P < 4. From the learning curve for P = 4, it can be deduced we can also achieve car numbers of optimal equilibria with more careful training.
Varying autonomy. We take P = 3 and vary the autonomy of demandᾱ ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7} without changing the total demandλ h +λ a . Note the demands are infeasible whenᾱ ∈ {0.4, 0.5}. In Fig. 5 (a) , we plot the number of cars (mean ± standard error over 100 simulations) in the system as a function of time steps. The result is similar to the previous experiment when the demand is feasible. With infeasible demand, RL agent keeps a queue that is only marginally longer than the queue that would be created by optimal equilibrium. On the other hand, selfish routing grows the queue with much faster rates. These experiments show RL policy successfully handles random initializations.
Perturbations. In the third set, we fix P = 3 andᾱ = 0.6 for the same total average demand. We evaluate what happens when we enable accidents and noise in the demand. We assume the standard deviations of the demand noise areλ h /10 and λ a /10 for human-driven and autonomous vehicles, respectively. We set the probability of accidents such that the expected frequency of accidents is 1 per 100 minutes, and clearing out an accident takes 30 minutes on average [37] . As it can be seen from Fig. 5 (b) , the RL agent successfully handles the perturbations due to accidents and noisy demands. This plot also shows how accidents perturb the system. To give a clearer picture, we provide detailed information about the system states in Fig. 6 , which shows the number of cars in each cell as well as the queue lengths over time. The small oscillations, which occur even after the effect of the accidents disappear (after fifth hour), are due to noisy demand and the discretization of cells. With selfish routing, the vehicles tend to not use the longest road. They use it only when there is an accident in another road (around first hour) or the other two roads are congested (around fourth hour). In contrast, RL makes good use of the network and leads to altruistic behavior. It also handles the accidents by effectively altering the routing of autonomous cars (around fourth hour, autonomous cars start using the first route until the accident is cleared). Hence, it manages to stabilize the queue and prevent congestion. We provide video visualizations of this run in the supplementary material. VI. CONCLUSION Summary. In this work we presented a framework for understanding a dynamic traffic network shared between selfish human drivers and controllable autonomous vehicles. We show, using reinforcement learning, we can find a policy to minimize the average travel time experienced by users of the network. We develop theoretical results to describe and calculate the best equilibria that can exist and show that our policy reaches the best possible equilibrium performance. Further, we provide case studies showing how the training period scales with the number of roads, and we show that our control policy is robust to accidents and stochastic demand.
Limitations. We used the number of cars in each cell as predictive features for RL training. Although this makes the state space dimensionality grow only linearly with the number of cells, it may not be scalable to much larger traffic networks.
Future work. This work opens up many future directions for research, including improving how the training time scales with the number of roads and extending this to more complex network topologies. Table I .
B. Queue dynamics
We consider a queue of vehicles that are waiting to join the network. In order to describe the dynamics of the queue we borrow the "packet" terminology from communication networks. We consider a packet of vehicles to be a tuple (q h j , q a j ), where q h j ∈ R ≥0 is a volume of human-driven vehicles and q a j ∈ R ≥0 is a volume of autonomous vehicles. At each time step a nonnegative random demand (λ h (k), λ a (k)) is added as a packet to the end of the queue, and vehicles enter the network starting from the front of the queue, starting with the zeroth packet. This structure preserves the first-in-first-out property for the network.
The factor limiting vehicles from entering the network is the supply on each road, (n p,1 − n p,1 (k))w p,1 (α p,1 (k)). We allocate as many packets, and fractions of packets, as possible until the supply constraint is violated on one of the roads. Formally, at each time step the queue is updated as in Autonomy level of (p, i) unitless n p,i (α)
Critical density of (p, i), at aut. α vehicles/cell n p,i Jam (maximum) density of (p, i) vehicles/cell constant, by (2), a constant state implies constant flows. By (3), a constant density also implies that the incoming and outgoing flow in each cell are equal. This means that all cells will have the same incoming flow as the first cell. Further, we know that since the density of autonomous vehicles is constant over time, incoming and outgoing autonomy levels are equal, i.e. α p,i−1 (k)f p,i−1 (k) = α p,i (k)f p,i (k). Since we also have f p,i−1 (k) = f p,i (k), this implies that α p,i−1 (k) =
